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THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY ANALYSIS
IN FEDERAL HOUSING LAW: IN
SEARCH OF UNIFORMITY
Under the United States Housing Act,1 the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) regularly contracts with local public
housing authorities and private landlords to provide housing for low
income families.2 Most courts acknowledge that low income tenants
are the intended beneficiaries of the Housing Act.' Yet many courts
have declined to grant tenants standing to sue as third-party benefi-
ciaries to the contracts between HUD and the landlord. This Recent
Development explores third-party beneficiary claims under federal
housing law, demonstrates the inconsistencies in analysis which have
caused a split among the circuit courts, and suggests an alternative res-
olution of the issue.
Several cases arising in Washington, D.C. illustrate the increasingly
restrictive view some courts have adopted toward third-party benefici-
ary claims under federal housing law. In an early case, Knox Hill Ten-
ant Council v. Washington,4 tenants brought an action against HUD
and the local housing authority for failure to maintain and repair sev-
eral housing projects.5 The majority's conclusion that plaintiffs had
stated a cause of action acknowledged, but did not rely on, third-party
beneficiary theory.6 In a partial concurrence, Judge Mackinnon stated
1. United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986); Housing Act of 1949, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
2. Id.
3. See infra note 45.
4. 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5. Id. at 1046-47.
6. The actual holding in Knox Hill was narrow. Although the court surveyed the
Housing Act, the Annual Contributions Contract, the Housing Regulations, and the
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that the plaintiffs were entitled to sue as third-party beneficiaries of the
contract between HUD and the local housing authority.7 Judge Mack-
innon stated that the third-party beneficiary claim presented an issue
traditionally resolved by the courts.8
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (D.C. Circuit) cited Judge MacKinnon's concurring opinion
twelve years later in Ashton v. Pierce.9 The Ashton court held that low
income tenants, as third-party beneficiaries of the Annual Contribu-
tions Contract (ACC) x° between HUD and the local housing authority,
could compel HUD to enforce compliance with the Lead-Based Paint
Poisoning Prevention Act (LPPA)." The court first noted that Con-
gress required HUD to establish lead-based paint regulations to apply
in housing programs such as the ACC.12 Next, the court found that
Congress expected HUD to monitor and enforce the authority's com-
pliance with those regulations. 3 According to the court, the author-
ity's duty under the ACC to provide "decent, safe and sanitary
dwellings" and "to maintain each project in good repair, order and
condition" implicitly gave rise to a duty to comply with the lead-based
lease, the court ultimately held only that the district court should not have nonsuited
appellants for failure to state a claim because the appellees' claim of sovereign immunity
failed to deprive the court of jurisdiction. Id. at 1058. The court did not state which, if
any, of the above factors provided a legitimate basis for the plaintiff's claims. The court
did state, however, that it did not "regard any of these approaches as insubstantial." Id.
at 1057.
7. Id. at 1066.
8. Id.
9. 716 F.2d 56, 66 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 723 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c (1982). Section 1437c provides for the creation of Annual
Contributions Contracts (ACCs). Although ACCs generally take the form of one of
several standard contracts, HUD and the housing authority are often responsible for
filling in the details of the ACC. Id.
11. Pub. L. No. 91-695, 84 Stat. 2078 (1971) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4822 (1982)).
Congress amended the Act in 1973, adding § 302, which provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development... shall establish procedures to
eliminate as far as practicable the hazards of lead-based paint poisoning with re-
spect to any existing housing which may present such hazards and which is cov-
ered by an application for. . . housing assistance payments under a program
administered by the Secretary.
Lead Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act § 302, Pub. L. No. 93-151, 87 Stat. 565-66
(1973).
12. 716 F.2d at 66.
13. Id. at 67.
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paint regulations.' 4 As third-party beneficiaries, plaintiffs could en-
force any duties arising in the contract.' 5
The D.C. Circuit limited the Ashton holding in Samuels v. District of
Columbia. 16 In Samuels, the court allowed plaintiffs to maintain a sec-
tion 198317 action against local public housing officials for failure to
provide a statutorily required grievance procedure.' 8 Although resolu-
tion of the third-party beneficiary claim was unnecessary, the court ad-
dressed the issue in a footnote. 9
The Samuels court stated that section 1983, rather than third-party
beneficiary law, provides the most direct means for redressing a local
housing authority's violation of federal law.2" The court stated, how-
14. The Annual Contributions Contracts often contain two standard sections. Sec-
tion 201 provides:
The Local Authority shall at all times operate each project (1) solely for the pur-
pose of providing decent, safe and sanitary dwellings...within the financial reach
of families of Low Income, (2) in such manner as to promote serviceability, effi-
ciency, economy, and stability, and (3) in such a manner as to achieve the eco-
nomic and social well-being of the tenants thereof.
Section 209 of the ACC provides: "The Local Authority shall at all times maintain
each Project in good repair, order and condition. Hereafter, these provisions will be
referred to as the "decent, safe and sanitary" provisions."
15. 716 F.2d at 67. Significantly, the Ashton court later amended this opinion, de-
leting the following sentence: "Further, it is the duty of the Department under the
Contract to ensure that the Authority keeps its promises or forfeits its annual right to
contributions." 723 F.2d 70 (1983). The deletion of this sentence signals the court's
retreat from imposing a duty on HUD to enforce the Authority's compliance with the
"decent, safe and sanitary" provisions, not an attempt to rescind the Authority's duty to
comply in good faith with the provisions.
16. 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides citizens with a civil action against any state
actor who deprives them of a federal right. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
18. 770 F.2d at 188. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had sys-
tematically failed to provide them with an administrative grievance forum for com-
plaints concerning the defendants' failure to maintain their dwelling units in accordance
with their leases. See Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 § 204, Pub. L.
98-181, 97 Stat. 1153, 1178 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (1986)).
19. 770 F.2d at 201 n. 14. Judge Friedman did not join the footnote because he did
not consider it necessary to the disposition of the case. Id.
20. Id.
1989]
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ever, that section 1983 does not provide public housing tenants with a
cause of action for a landlord's random and unauthorized failure to
maintain "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings" as required by federal
law.21 The court stated that to extend third-party beneficiary theory to
establish a federal cause of action for discrete and random disputes
would be plainly inconsistent with the structure of federal housing
law.22
The Samuels court thus implicitly negated the Ashton ruling that the
housing authority had a duty, enforceable by third-party beneficiaries
in federal court, to comply with the ACC's requirement of "decent,
safe and sanitary dwellings." 23 Instead, the court limited Ashton to its
narrow facts: specifically, Congress' clear intent to require HUD to
enforce the Authority's compliance with lead-based paint removal
regulations.24
In the Samuels footnote, the D.C. Circuit apparently ignored the
finding in Ashton that the Authority's duty to comply with the paint
removal regulations arose from the contractual duty to provide decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings. 25 The court thus attempted to erase the
Ashton language recognizing third-party beneficiary status to enforce
the general maintenance provisions of the ACC.26 The court's reason-
ing is faulty insofar as it would strike the basic duty of maintenance
recognized in Ashton, while upholding the derivative duty to observe
the regulations.
Recently, the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia affirmed the Samuels reluctance to recognize third-party benefici-
ary status for federal housing tenants. In Edwards v. District of
21. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
22. 770 F.2d at 201 n.14.
23. In addition, the court apparently intended to limit the scope of Knox Hill Ten-
ant's Council in the Samuels footnote.
24. 770 F.2d at 201 n.14.
25. The Ashton court explicitly stated that the Authority's duty to comply with the
lead-based paint regulations was derivative:
[B]y fair implication, compliance with the lead-based paint elimination require-
ments is a necessary component of the Authority's duties under sections 201 and
209 of the Contracts, respectively, to provide "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings"
and to "maintain each Project in good repair, order and condition."
Ashton v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 56, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
26. In addition, the court attempted to strike down any potential claim to a statu-
tory duty in the housing authority to provide decent, safe and sanitary dwellings in
accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1437c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Samuels, 770 F.2d at 66.
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Columbia,27 plaintiffs claimed that a housing project owner who al-
lowed a project to fall into a state of disrepair had constructively de-
molished the project without fulfilling certain statutory prerequisites to
demolition.28 In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the Authority had
failed to provide statutorily required standard housing.2 9 According to
the plaintiffs, the statutory violations amounted to a breach of the pro-
ject owner's contractual duty to provide "decent, safe and sanitary"
housing.3" The plaintiffs sought to compel HUD to monitor and en-
force compliance with the contract.31
The district court held that the plaintiffs did not have third-party
beneficiary status to compel HUD to make the owner comply with the
"decent, safe and sanitary" standard.32 The court reasoned that the
contract directed the project owner, not HUD, to meet this standard.33
The contract provisions thus did not impose an obligation on HUD to
ensure that the plaintiffs received standard housing. 34 In addition, the
court reasoned that the Samuels footnote35 merely suggested that the
plaintiffs in Ashton could proceed against HUD "on a breach of con-
tract theory [stemming] from the express command of the Lead-Based
Paint Prevention Act, not the terms of the ACC or plaintiffs' status as
third-party beneficiaries. '36
27. 628 F. Supp. 33 (D. D.C. 1985).
28. Id. at 335. The court stated that the statutory prerequisites to demolition which
arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(2) (1986) are only relevant once a demolition applica-
tion has been approved. Id at 342. Therefore, no federal statutory right was impli-
cated, according to the court. Nonetheless, the court proceeded to address the contract
claims. Id. at 342-43. See infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
29. 628 F. Supp. at 343-344. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a(b)(1), 1439(d)(1) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
30. 628 F. Supp. at 344.
31. Id.
32. Id. The contract in Edwards thus contained the same §§ 201 and 209 as the
contract in Ashton. For the text of those sections see supra note 14.
33. 628 F. Supp. at 344. See also supra note 14 for the text of the contract, which
directs the local authority to provide decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings.
34. 628 F. Supp. at 344.
35. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
36. 628 F. Supp. at 344. By stating that the defendants' duty in Ashton stemmed
directly from the LPPA rather than the ACC, the district court in Edwards actually
went beyond the court of appeals' footnote in Samuels. Id. The Samuels court did not
expressly state that the third-party claim in Ashton was rooted in the language of the
LPPA instead of the Authority's duties under the ACC. Samuels v. District of Colum-
bia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Rather, the Samuels court stated that no § 1983
action would lie for discrete and random disputes arising from the Authority's failure to
1989]
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The district court in Edwards thus eviscerated the Ashton court's
finding that the housing authority's duty to comply with the LPPA
arose from an implied contractual duty to provide decent, safe and san-
itary housing.37 In addition, the Edwards court offered the implausible
rationale that the Ashton plaintiffs proceeded on a breach of contract
theory stemming from the express command of the Lead-Based Paint
Prevention Act.3 8 Because the LPPA does not expressly provide for
the creation of any contracts, the court's reading of Ashton is suspect.3 9
The court may have meant that the plaintiffs proceeded on the theory
that they were third-party beneficiaries of an implied contract. 40 It is
unlikely, however, that the Edwards court would accept third-party
beneficiary claim on the basis of an implied contract when it was reluc-
tant to allow such a claim on the express contracts between HUD and
the housing authority.4 1
The Edwards and Samuels courts thus ignored the language in Ash-
provide decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings in compliance with the statute, and that by
analogy plaintiffs could not bring third-party beneficiary claims for discrete and random
contract disputes. Id. at 201 n.14. The Samuels court thus implied that the language in
Ashton which recognized a contractual duty in the Authority to provide decent, safe,
and sanitary dwellings was either dicta or, at best, one possible basis for the decision.
Id. The district court in Edwards went beyond this, however, stating explicitly that the
defendants' duty in Ashton arose under the LPPA rather than the ACC. Edwards, 628
F. Supp. at 344.
37. The Samuels court may have been reluctant to explicitly overrule the language
it had employed in Ashton only two years earlier. The Edwards court, on the other
hand, may have seen the Samuels footnote as a springboard for rolling back earlier,
overbroad language.
38. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39. The Housing Authority does not appear to have any contractual duty to elimi-
nate lead-based paint under the LPPA unless the duty arises from the Authority's con-
tractual duty to provide decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings. Pub. L. No. 91-695, 84
Stat. 2078 (1971) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4822 (1982)).
40. An implied contract is defined as:
one not created or evidenced by the explicit agreement of the parties, but inferred
by the law, as a matter of reason and justice from their acts or conduct, the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction making it a reasonable, or even a necessary
assumption that a contract existed between them by tacit understanding.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 292-93 (5th ed. 1979).
41. On appeal, the plaintiffs narrowed their claims, arguing only that they had
third-party beneficiary status to challenge the explicit statutory protection against un-
warranted demolition, and not to enforce the decent, safe, and sanitary provisions. Ed-
wards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court of
appeals thus did not reach the issue of whether the plaintiffs could enforce the decent,
safe, and sanitary provisions of the contract of the analogous statutory provisions. Id.
Instead, the court held that the defendants had not violated the demolition statute;
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ton which conferred a duty on the housing authority to provide decent,
safe and sanitary housing. Neither court flatly rejected the holding in
Ashton, however, and the resulting "reinterpretations" have muddled
the third-party beneficiary issue in federal court. It is clear, however,
that the D.C. Circuit currently disfavors third-party beneficiary claims
by federal housing tenants.
Other courts have not been as circumspect when denying federal
housing tenants' third-party beneficiary claims. In Perry v. Housing
Authority of the City of Charleston,42 the Fourth Circuit held that
based on other court decisions, the statutory scheme, the ACC, and the
lease, the plaintiffs were not third-party beneficiaries of the contract
between HUD and the Housing Authority.4 3 To the extent that the
Perry court based its analysis of the statutory scheme on implied right
of action analysis rather than third-party beneficiary theory, however,
the court's reasoning fails.'
Courts frequently misapply the implied right of action test to third-
party beneficiary claims.45 To determine whether private parties have
an implied right of action under a statute, courts first decide whether
plaintiffs are members of the class that the legislation intended to bene-
fit.46 The Perry court found that tenants were only indirect benefi-
therefore, even if the plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries, there was no statutory
violation on which to base recovery. Id. at 662.
42. 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981).
43. Id. at 1218.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 45-53 for a comparison of implied right of
action analysis and third-party beneficiary theory.
45. See Note, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied Right of Action Analysis: The
Fiction of One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875 (1985). This Note argues that
courts mistakenly collapse the distinction between third-party beneficiary and implied
right of action analysis. The author claims that in equating government intent with
congressional intent, courts ignore the impact agencies can have on contractual intent
through policymaking and contract drafting. While congressional intent is dispositive
in implied right of action analysis, the Note continues, agencies often are capable of
conferring third-party beneficiary status. When courts equate the two analyses, how-
ever, they undermine the independence of third-party beneficiary analysis which arises
from the agency's role. Id. at 881-883.
46. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court enumerated four criteria
for determining an implied right of action:
1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose especial benefit the
legislation was enacted;
2) whether there is an explicit or implicit indication of congressional intent to deny
or create a remedy;
3) whether a private remedy would be consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme;
19891
Washington University Open Scholarship
210 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 35:203
ciaries of the Act, while states were the primary, or direct
beneficiaries.47
Next the court examines the statutory language and the legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended to allow a private
right of action for low income tenants."a The Perry court found that
Congress did not implicitly grant low income tenants a private right of
action under the Housing Act.4 9 As a result, the court concluded that
4) whether the action is one traditionally relegated to state law.
Id. at 78.
The Cort test, however, has been narrowed substantially. In Touche Ross Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979), Justice Rehnquist stated that the ultimate ques-
tion is "one of congressional intent, not whether this Court thinks that it can improve
upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Id. The first three factors
thus form the basis for discerning congressional intent; the Court now considers the
fourth factor irrelevant. Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770
(1987). Specifically, the Court stated that in determining legislative intent, courts
should consider the "language and focus of the statute, its legislative history and its
purpose." Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-576.
47. Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213.
48. See supra note 46.
49. 664 F.2d at 1213. Contrary to the Perry court interpretation, the statutory lan-
guage indicates quite clearly that low income families are the intended beneficiaries of
the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982) states in pertinent part:
It is the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of the nation by
employing its funds ... to assist the several states.. .to remedy the unsafe and
unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary
dwellings for families of low income.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1967) states:
[Tihe general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living stan-
dards of its people require housing production and related community develop-
ment sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of
substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and
blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home
and suitable living environment for every American family.
Id.
Five of seven cases cited by the Perry court found that low income families were the
primary beneficiaries of the Act. See Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 509 (1st
Cir. 1979) (low income tenants are prime beneficiaries of § 1441); Thompson v. Wash-
ington, 497 F.2d 626, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (section 1402 intended to limit rent for low
income families); Nat'l Tenants' Org. v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 358 F.
Supp. 312, 314 (D. D.C. 1973) (public housing tenants are primary beneficiaries of
Housing Act of 1937); Silva v. East Providence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 464 (D.
R.I. 1976) (low income families are beneficiaries of § 1401). But cf. Shivers v. Landrieu,
674 F.2d 906, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (12 U.S.C. § 1743 has no "especial beneficiaries");
Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrolsby Square v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 648, 652 (D. D.C.
1974) (12 U.S.C. § 17151 was passed to eliminate slums, not to benefit any particular
class of tenants). Note, however, that the last two cases cited by the court contra arose
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plaintiffs were not third-party beneficiaries of the contract between
HUD and the Housing Authority.
In addressing plaintiffs' third-party beneficiary claims, the Perry
court erred by surveying only congressional intent and not the intent of
HUD and the Housing Authority. Although an implied right of action
analysis primarily involves discerning congressional intent, third-party
beneficiary analysis involves surveying the intent of the parties to the
contract.50 To the extent that Congress gives an agency discretion to
set the terms of a contract, the agency's intent is relevant to third-party
beneficiary claims.5" Because Congress left HUD considerable discre-
tion to supply some of the terms of the Annual Contributions Contract,
the Perry court should have examined the contract to determine if
HUD intended to confer third-party beneficiary status on the
tenants.52
This omission by the Perry court makes it difficult to discern whether
HUD and the Housing Authority intended to make the tenants third-
party beneficiaries of the contracts.53 Coupled with the court's thread-
bare analysis, this oversight seriously weakens the Perry opinion. In
addition, as the next section will demonstrate, other courts have read
congressional and agency intent under the Housing Act to favor third-
party beneficiary standing on the basis of contracts.
Despite Perry, the trend in the D.C. Circuit, and similar holdings in
other jurisdictions, there is a small counter-trend arising in other cir-
cuits which recognizes third-party beneficiary status for claimants
under the Housing Act.
under the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1934), not the United States Hous-
ing Act. In addition to erroneously treating these two Acts as interchangeable, the
Perry court erred by confusing the statutory method of providing federal assistance to
the states under the United States Housing Act with the "goal" of providing a "decent
home and suitable living environment for every American family." 42 U.S.C. § 1441
(1982). As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d
1261 (7th Cir. 1981), "If the tenants are not the primary beneficiaries of a program
designed to provide housing assistance payments to low income families, the legitimacy
of the multi-billion dollar section 8 program is placed in grave doubt." Id. at 1271.
50. See Note, supra note 45, at 881-883.
51. Id.
52. Although Annual Contributions Contracts vary in type, HUD has considerable
discretion to set many of the terms of the standard form contracts. An examination of
the intent of HUD and the housing authority in the ACC, as well as of congressional
intent, would have given the Perry court the proper perspective for applying third-party
beneficiary analysis.
53. See supra note 52.
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In Holbrook v. Pitt,54 low income tenants brought an action seeking
prompt implementation of the ACC and the receipt of retroactive
housing benefits in response to the owner's improper certification of
tenants which had resulted in the delayed start of payments. 55 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had third-party
beneficiary status to bring such claims.56 The court based its determi-
nation on an analysis of congressional intent, the legislative history of
the Housing Act, the terms of the Annual Contributions Contract, and
the relevant HUD regulations.5 7
The Holbrook court first noted that Congress authorized section 8
housing payments in order to assist lower income families in obtaining
decent housing and to promote economically mixed housing.58 The
court rejected HUD's argument that financially troubled HUD-insured
housing projects were the prime beneficiaries of the contracts and that
low income families were only incidental beneficiaries.59 The court
noted that because section 8 funds were allocated according to the fi-
nancial needs of tenants, not the housing projects, Congress' primary
intent was to benefit tenants. ° In addition, the court reasoned that
54. 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 1265.
56. Id. at 1273.
57. Id. at 1264-76.
58. Id. at 1271.
59. Id.
60. The Holbrook opinion is also notable for its interpretation of the Restatement
position. A proposed section of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provided:
1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to
pay money to the beneficiary; or
b) the promisee manifests an intention to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance.
2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.
643 F.2d at 1270-71 n.17 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent.
Draft 1968). The Holbrook court reject the opinion in § l(b) that only the intention of
the "promisee" (HUD), and not the intention of the promisor (the housing authority), is
relevant to a determination of the tenants' rights as possible third-party beneficiaries.
The court stated: "Contracts are the product of shared intentions.... It is improper to
neglect the reasonable expectations of the promisor. . . ." Id. But cf. Vazman, S.A. v.
Fidelity Int'l. Bank, 418 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); O'Boyle v. DuBose-Killeen
Properties, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
The Holbrook court failed to note an ambiguity in the language of § 1 of the Restate-
ment which supports the court's interpretation. Section 1 states that the intention of
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under agency regulations HUD made funding calculations on the basis
of tenant, not project, need.6 1
Finally, the court found numerous contract provisions which clearly
indicated the contracts existed primarily for the tenant's benefit.62 In
particular, the court relied on paragraph 1.7 of the contract, which
required the owners to "maintain and operate the contract unit... as to
provide decent, safe and sanitary housing.",63 The Holbrook opinion
thus appears to contradict the statement in the Samuels footnote that
tenants would not have third-party beneficiary standing to sue project
owners for failure to comply with contractual provisions calling for the
maintenance of "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings."" If Holbrook is
distinguishable from the Samuels footnote, it is because in Holbrook
plaintiffs did not seek to compel compliance with the "decent, safe and
sanitary" terms, but instead sought to compel prompt implementation
of the ACC and the receipt of retroactive benefits. 65 Nonetheless, it is
likely that the Holbrook court would have upheld a third-party benefi-
ciary claim against the project owner for failure to provide "decent,
safe and sanitary" dwellings as required in the contract.66
the "parties" is relevant to whether plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries under the
contract, indicating that the intent of the promisor, as well as the intent of the promisee
in § (1)(b), should be considered in third-party beneficiary analysis. For a detailed dis-
cussion of this point and the Restatement (Second) treatment of third-party beneficiary
claims, see Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 880, 887-99 (1982). See also 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 356A (1959) ("[I]t is the intent or purpose of the promisee who pays for the promise
that has been generally looked upon as governing.").
61. The Holbrook court examined 42 Fed. Reg. 5602 (1977) which provides: "The
purpose of this program is to assist families presently in occupancy in a HUD-insured
or HUD-assisted project to more easily carry their rental burden." Id.
The court also examined 24 C.F.R. § 886.197(d) (1980), which provides that con-
tracts may be executed only after a project owner establishes that a significant number
of potential or existing tenants "are eligible for and in need of Section 8 assistance." Id.
62. 643 F.2d at 1272.
63. Id. The Holbrook court also examined paragraph 1.3(b)(1) of the contract
which provided: "The Government hereby agrees to make housing assistance payments
on behalf of families to lease Decent, Safe and Sanitary housing pursuant to Section 8 of
the Act." Id. at 1272.
In addition, the court noted that paragraph 1.10 of the contract restricts owners'
rights to evict tenants, paragraph 1.9(a) required affirmative action in leasing, and para-
graph 1.9(b) limited the owner's discretion in collecting and refunding utility and secur-
ity deposits. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying note 25.
65. 643 F.2d at 1265.
66. The Holbrook court stated, "The plaintiffs have enforceable rights since the con-
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Two federal district courts have recently followed Holbrook in rec-
ognizing federal housing tenants' claims to third-party beneficiary sta-
tus under the contracts between HUD and local housing authorities.
In Mabry v. Village Management, Inc.67 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted third-party benefici-
ary status to federal housing applicants who alleged discriminatory ten-
ant selection policies. 8  The Mabry court considered two factors
dispositive.69 First, the court noted that the Housing Act was designed
to aid lower income families in obtaining decent housing.70 Next, the
court noted that the housing project owners had agreed to a contract
provision prohibiting discrimination in tenant selection.7 Following
Holbrook, the Mabry court found that the plaintiffs were the intended
beneficiaries of the contracts between HUD and the project owners.
Consequently, the tenants could sue to enforce the anti-discrimination
provisions." Thus, the Mabry court expanded Holbrook the decision
by extending third-party beneficiary status to federal housing
applicants.
In Gonzalez v. St. Margaret's House Housing Development Fund
Corp.,73 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York also followed Holbrook, holding that tenants had standing
as third-party beneficiaries to challenge certain contract provisions.
74
The plaintiffs in Gonzalez were federal housing tenants who challenged
a mandatory meal charge as violative of rent limitations imposed by
the Brooke Amendment." Describing the Holbrook language as "per-
tracts were intended to provide them with rental assistance." Id. at 1273. Although
this statement is broader than the court's actual holding that plaintiffs were entitled to
prompt implementation of the ACC and the receipt of retroactive benefits, the court's
specific analysis of the contract provisions indicates that the court was inclined to allow
tenants to enforce those provisions as third-party beneficiaries.
67. 1986 WL 5743 (N.D. Ill.).
68. 1986 WL 5743 at 2.
69. Id. at 5-6.
70. Id. at 6.
71. Id. at 7.
72. The Mabry court cited Holbrook for the proposition that § 8 was intended to
benefit lower income families. Id. at 5-6.
73. 620 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
74. Id. at 810.
75. The Brooke Amendment to § 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42
U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1988) imposes a 30% rent limitation on assisted
units, which prohibits requiring a tenant to pay more than 30% of her family's monthly
adjusted income as rent. The tenants in Gonzalez argued that "rent" included utilities,
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suasive," the Gonzalez court stated that tenants are the prime benefi-
ciaries of the section 8 housing payments program.7 6
The Supreme Court recently held, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Re-
development and Housing Authority,77 that tenants have a private sec-
tion 1983 cause of action to enforce the rent limitations of the Brooke
Amendment. This holding reinforces the Gonzalez opinion, yet also
diminishes its importance.78 Plaintiffs aggrieved by alleged rent
overcharges may now bring a section 1983 action directly against the
project owner, thus eliminating the need to rely on the third-party ben-
eficiary theory.79 Gonzalez nonetheless retains significance as the only
recent case outside of the Seventh Circuit to grant federal housing ten-
ants standing as third-party beneficiaries of the housing contracts.80
The circuit courts are divided as to whether low income tenants have
third-party beneficiary status to contracts arising under the Housing
Act. In the D.C. Circuit, early cases apparently recognized such sta-
tus, but the court recently denied tenants' standing as third party bene-
ficiaries to enforce the "decent, safe and sanitary" provisions of the
Annual Contributions Contract. Meanwhile, the Perry court and other
jurisdictions have denied third-party beneficiary status to tenants, in
part because of the inappropriate application of the implied right of
action test to third-party beneficiary analysis.81 Conversely, Holbrook,
Mabry, and Gonzalez represent three instances where courts have
granted third-party beneficiary status to federal housing tenants.82 The
contradictory holdings in these cases is due in part to varying factual
settings and the courts' focus on different statutory language and con-
tract provisions. Nonetheless, both the spirit and the language of the
opinions are occasionally in direct conflict.
Whether plaintiffs have third-party beneficiary status often depends
on whether the applicable contract provision sets forth "enforceable
and therefore, a utility surcharge imposed on them violated the statute. 620 F. Supp. at
810.
76. Id.
77. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
78. Id. at 429. The Wright opinion also reinforces the Samuels footnote, if only
indirectly, by endorsing the plaintiffs' use of the private § 1983 cause of action. This
parallels the Samuels court's emphasis on § 1983 actions as an alternative to third-party
beneficiary claims in a similar case.
79. See supra note 78.
80. 620 F. Supp. at 811.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 54-80.
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standards."83 Because courts have broad discretion to determine the
enforceability of a contract provision, a section 1983 claim may be a
more direct means to determine which federal housing claims belong in
federal court.84 Section 1983, however, only applies when a state actor
deprives a person of a right secured by the Constitution or by federal
law.85 Where the housing statute and the housing contract contain
provisions calling for "decent, safe and sanitary" dwellings, tenants
may choose to employ a section 1983 action rather than a contract
claim.86 Tenants who seek to enforce a contract provision when there
is no analogous statutory provision, however, cannot utilize section
1983.87
The Samuels court's emphasis on section 1983 actions is misplaced.
The Samuels court erred by focusing solely on Congress' intent in the
federal housing laws, while ignoring the intent of the contracting par-
ties.88 Resolution of the section 1983 question fails to address the in-
tent of HUD and the local housing authority regarding a plaintiff's
status as a beneficiary of the contract. 89 Courts must address these
issues separately in order to assess properly the rights of federal hous-
ing tenants. 90
Even a court that properly undertakes third-party beneficiary analy-
sis will face varying interpretations of the test.91 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts is ambiguous as to whether courts should con-
sider the intent of both the promisor and the promisee. 92 Other au-
thorities state that the intent of the promisor, or the performing party,
is most relevant.93 In the federal housing law context, the question
83. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 628 F. Supp. 33 (D. D.C. 1985).
84. See supra note 17 for text of § 1983.
85. See Id.
86. Compare the suggestion of the Samuels court in its footnote, discussed supra in
text accompanying notes 20-26.
87. Section 1983 will not provide a cause of action for the plaintiffs suing on a
contract because the rights of the tenants under the contract do not constitute rights
secured by the federal laws or the Constitution.
88. See supra note 45.
89. See supra note 45.
90. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 60.
92. See supra note 60 for text of the Restatement (Second) position.
93. See Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
67 CORNELL L. RIv. 880 (1982). See also supra note 60 and cases cited therein. More-
over, several writers have criticized the Restatement (Second) test of intent as too nar-
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becomes whether to examine only HUD's intent in the contract, or to
examine the intent of the local housing authority as well. The Hol-
brook court examined both and determined that the housing author-
ity's agreement to certain restrictions on its behavior demonstrated
intent to grant the benefit of the contract to the tenants.94
Because contracts embody "shared intentions,"9" the Holbrook ap-
proach seems superior to the Restatement's. Nonetheless, all parties
who enter contractual relationships agree to restrict their behavior in
some manner. Courts therefore should determine when agreement to
restricted behavior demonstrates a promisor's intent to grant the bene-
fit of a contract. Courts should consider the nature and magnitude of
the restrictions as well as comparable statutory provisions as evidence
of the intent of the agency and the housing authority. Courts should
also carefully differentiate between congressional intent and agency in-
tent when the agency lawfully exercises its discretion.
In the federal housing context, courts could interpret the housing
authority's agreement to provide "decent, safe and sanitary" housing
as evidence of the authority's intent to confer the benefit of the contract
upon the tenants. Although these terms lack specificity, they arguably
provide judicially enforceable standards similar to the warranty of hab-
itability found in landlord tenant law.96 In addition, congressional in-
rowly focused. See, eg., Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Intention Standard: A
Search for Rational Contract Decisionmaking, 54 VA. L. REV. 1166 (1968). The author
suggests that courts should consider reliance by third parties and social policy concerns
in hearing third-party beneficiary claims. Although no courts appear to have adopted
this approach explicitly, these factors may affect courts' judgments even though they
profess to apply the intent tests. In the housing context, social policy considerations
weigh heavily in favor of allowing tenants to sue to enforce the housing contracts as
third-party beneficiaries. On the other hand, reliance factors would weigh against low
income tenants because their lack of viable housing alternatives often means that they
have not relied to their detriment on the promises between HUD and the housing au-
thority. Another author proposes that contracting parties create third-party beneficiary
status in another when either the contract contains an express promise to that effect or
such a promise may be reasonably implied in fact. See Note, The Third Party Benefici-
ary Concept: A Proposal, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 406 (1957). Unfortunately, the "reason-
ably implied in fact" test does not provide judges with particularly helpful standard to
determine intent. See generally Jones, Legal Protection of the Third Party Beneficiaries:
On Opening Courthouse Doors, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 313 (1977).
94. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
95. Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1272 (7th Cir. 1981).
96. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Jack Spring,
Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 808 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.1-5.6 (1977).
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tent in the housing statute could support a parallel finding that tenants
are third-party beneficiaries of the contract, although courts must ac-
knowledge that agencies can confer such status without an expression
of congressional intent.97 Furthermore, third-party beneficiary status
is implied by contract provisions employing the mandatory "shall" in
directing the project owner to provide "decent, safe and sanitary"
housing.
9 8
Finally, despite the fears of the Samuels and Edwards courts,99 rec-
ognition of third-party beneficiary status in federal housing tenants will
not result in federal litigation over "random and unauthorized" activ-
ity by a local housing authority."°° Isolated incidents of disrepair will
not amount to breaches of the ACC because the purpose of the con-
tract is to ensure that the authority provides decent, safe and sanitary
conditions in the entire housing project.101 Tenants aggrieved by iso-
lated incidents should seek their remedies under the lease in the state
court, leaving federal courts as the proper forum for significant, pro-
ject-wide disputes which stem from federal housing policy or HUD's
failure to enforce the ACC.
Kenneth L. Scott*
97. See supra note 45.
98. See supra note 14 for text of the contract provisions.
99. See supra text accompanying footnotes 20-22 and 32-36.
100. See supra text accompanying footnotes 21-22.
101. See supra note 14 for the text of §§ 201, 209 of the ACC. Section 209 directs
the housing authority to maintain each project in good repair, order, and condition.
* J.D. 1988, Washington University.
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